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European Central Bank Working Paper Series 52Abstract
We study 30 vintages of FRB/US, the principal macro model used by
the Federal Reserve Board staﬀ for forecasting and policy analysis. To
do this, we exploit archives of the model code, coeﬃcients, baseline data-
bases and stochastic shock sets stored after each FOMC meeting from the
model’s inception in July 1996 until November 2003. The period of study
was one of important changes in the U.S. economy with a productivity
boom, a stock market boom and bust, a recession, the Asia crisis, the
Russian debt default, and an abrupt change in ﬁscal policy. We docu-
ment the surprisingly large and consequential changes in model properties
that occurred during this period and compute optimal Taylor-type rules
for each vintage. We compare these optimal rules against plausible al-
ternatives. Model uncertainty is shown to be a substantial problem; the
eﬃcacy of purportedly optimal policy rules should not be taken on faith.
• JEL Classiﬁcations: E37, E5, C5, C6.
• Keywords: monetary policy, uncertainty, real-time analysis.
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Over the past decade or so, there has been an explosion of work studying the char-
acteristics of monetary policy rules in general, and interest-rate feedback rules in
particular. While considerable insight has come out of this literature, so has a fun-
damental critique, namely that rules formulated "optimally" may not be robust to
model misspeciﬁcation. This paper provides a detailed, real-world examination of
model uncertainty as captured by the historical model archives of the Federal Re-
serve staﬀ’s principal macroeconomic model. In particular, we study 30 vintages of
the FRB/US model, the workhorse model used by the staﬀ for forecasting and policy
analysis, from the model’s inception in July 1996 until November 2003. Exploiting
the archive allows us to examine the issues in a real-time environment and with a
much broader concept of uncertainty in mind than is usually the case. So, for ex-
ample, rather than just focussing on data or parameter uncertainty, we also take on
structural uncertainty and uncertainty with regard to the shocks to which the econ-
omy is subject. Lastly, the archive allows us to work with model that is actually
used to inform policymakers, as opposed to an academic laboratory model. It there-
fore constrains the set of possible models to a realistic set and focusses attention on
real-world uncertainties.
The period under consideration was one of important changes in the United States.
The economy withstood a productivity boom, a stock market boom and bust, a
recession, the Russian debt default, the Asia crisis, and an abrupt change in ﬁscal
policy, to name just a few events.
We do four things in the paper: we examine the real-time data; we document
changes in model properties over time; we compute optimized Taylor-type rules for
each model vintage; and we examine the performance of candidate policy rules in
selected model vintages.
We begin with the data, looking at some of the key real-time series as stored in the
5
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April 2006model’s historical databases. We ﬁnd important revisions over time in the growth of
non-farm potential business output, and in the GDP output gap. Since it is surprises
i nt h ed a t at h a td r i v ec h a n g e si nt h em o d e l ,t h i sﬁnding stands as a harbinger of
what follows.
We then examine time variation in model properties as captured by the response
of the model to speciﬁc shocks—the so-called "model multipliers". We compute the
response of unemployment to a policy of disinﬂation, a persistent increase in the
federal fund rate, a persistent increase in government expenditures, and a change in
the trend growth rate of productivity. For each vintage, we compare the multiplier
o ft h em o s tr e c e n tm o d e lw i t ht h em u l t i p l i e r so fe a r l i e rv i n t a g e s .W eﬁnd diﬀerences
in the multipliers over time that are economically important and surprisingly large
given the short date range under consideration.
Next we compute optimized Taylor rules by minimizing a quadratic loss function
subject to each model vintage and the associated set of stochastic shocks. Here too,
we ﬁnd that the optimized coeﬃcients vary considerably from vintage to vintage,
with a remarkable upward trend in the optimal response to the output gap in more
recent vintages.
Lastly, we compare policy rules for their ability to control the model economy for
two model vintages, February 1997, and November 2003, to see if the diﬀerences in
optimized policy coeﬃcients have important implications for economic outcomes. We
ﬁnd that they do. In particular, we ﬁnd that Taylor rules that have been optimized
conditional on a certain model, baseline database and set of stochastic shocks can
render a poor performance in alternative worlds as represented by a diﬀerent model
vintage, or diﬀerent shocks. It follows that believing too much in the veracity of a
model can result in poor economic outcomes.
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Over the past decade or so, there has been an explosion of work studying the char-
acteristics of monetary policy rules in general, and interest-rate feedback rules in
particular. Some papers have studied optimal targeting rules, in the parlance of
Svensson (2002); other papers have studied instrument rules, sometimes with coeﬃ-
cients that have been chosen in an ad hoc fashion, and other times with coeﬃcients
that have been optimized.1 The typical contribution in this area, posits a quadratic
loss function,2 a time-invariant, known linear model,3 Gaussian disturbances, and
a policy rule of a given form.4 The optimal rule can then be constructed, some-
times analytically, but more often numerically, using established techniques. While
considerable insight has come out of this literature, so has a fundamental critique,
namely that rules formulated in this way may not be robust to misspeciﬁcation. One
of the earliest and most ardent critics of the standard practice was Bennett McCal-
lum (1988). McCallum’s speciﬁc proposal was to compare the candidate policies in
a number of rival models and judge the "best" policy on its performance across the
entire set. This argument has garnered a sizeable contingent of advocates in recent
years with notable applications including Levin et al. (1999, 2003). The rival models
method has taken an important place alongside other methods, including analyses of
parameter uncertainty and data uncertainty, as devices for "robustifying" monetary
policy. 5
1Optimal targeting rules have been championed by Svensson (1999,2000) and Svensson and Wood-
ford (2003). Instrument rules go back much further. The catalyst for the most recent spate of papers
on the subject was the papers of Henderson and McKibbin (1993) and Taylor (1993). Both strands
of the literature are lengthy.
2Sometimes the loss function is an ad hoc one, said to represent the policy maker’s preferences
independent of the model to which the loss function is to be applied, as in Williams (2003) for
example. In other cases, the loss function is a quadratic approximation to the representative agent’s
utility function in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model, as in Rotemberg and
Woodford (1999).
3A linear model, or a non-linear model that has been linearized around its steady state. Recent
contributions to the literature argue against linearization on the grounds that welfare comparisions
of alternative policies on linearized models are often false; see, e.g., Kim and Kim (2003). See
Benigno and Woodford (2004) for an argument that linearization has more valid applications than
some would think.
4In the case of what Svensson calls optimal targeting rules, the form of the rule is given by the
structure of the model. For optimal instrument rules, the form of the rule is simpliﬁed in a form
determined by the researcher on practical grounds, usually having to do with communications or
tractability.
5The analysis of parameter uncertainty usually involves conditioning the optimal policy on the
standard errors of estimated model coeﬃcients. The seminal reference is Brainard (1968). More
recent contributions include Sack (1999) and Soderstrom (2002). Data uncertainty obliges policy
7
ECB
Working Paper Series No 610
April 2006Two other strands of the literature stand in contrast to these Bayesian approaches.
The ﬁrst of these is the robust control (or min-max) approach, championed in various
forms by Hansen and Sargent (1995, 2004), Giannoni (2002), Onatski (2003) and
Tetlow and von zur Muehlen (2001, 2004). The second examines uncertainty from a
real-time perspective, the approach adopted in this paper.
The real-time analysis of policy is useful and important for several reasons. First,
by examining the historical record, the researcher captures the real thing, not what
an econometrician thinks, ex post, the real thing might have been. This is partic-
ularly important in the real-world setting where models have to be rolled out with
due consideration to a work and data-release schedule. Second, real-time analysis
can uncover issues that the econometrician might not envision, such as idiosyncratic
shocks that would be omitted from a statistical model but are nonetheless important
for policy.6 Third, in the present context of addressing model uncertainty, real-time
analysis narrows the range of would-be rival models under consideration to a plausible
set.
This paper considers, measures and evaluates real-time model uncertainty in the
United States. In particular, we study 30 vintages of the Board of Governors’ work-
horse macroeconomic model, FRB/US, that were used extensively for forecasting and
policy analysis at the Fed from the model’s inception in July 1996 until November
2003. To do this, we exploit archives of the model code, coeﬃcients, databases and
stochastic shock sets for each vintage. The period of study was one of remarkable
change in the U.S. economy with a productivity boom, a stock market boom and
bust, a recession, the Asia crisis, the Russian debt default, corporate governance
scandals and an abrupt change in ﬁscal policy. There were also 23 changes in the
intended federal funds rate, 7 increases and 16 decreases. We document the changes
in the model properties that occurred during this period—a surprisingly large and
consequential set, it turns out—and identify the economic events that contributed to
these changes. We compute optimal Taylor-type rules for each vintage. We compare
these ex ante optimal rules against alternative rules, including an ex post optimal
rule, and the original Taylor (1993) speciﬁcation. We draw conclusions about model
uncertainty and its implications for policy design.
This exercise goes a number of steps beyond previous contributions to the litera-
ture. First, unlike the rival-models literature, it does not involve models of artiﬁcial
economies compared in a laboratory environment. Research in this area, while im-
portant and useful, is limited by the set of rival models and how they were selected.
Second, we go beyond the literature on parameter uncertainty. That literature as-
sumes that parameters are random but the model is ﬁxed over time; misspeciﬁcation
makers to take into explicit account pending data revisions. See Croushore and Stark (2001) and
Rudebusch (2003).
6The authors’ favorite example of this is Y2K, where a "forecastable shock" to the optimal
decision rules of ﬁrms was in play and was important, but had never occurred in the historical
dataset and would never again.
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response not just to the data but the economic issues of the day.7 Lastly, and most
important, the analysis we provide derives from models that were actually used to
advise on monetary policy decisions. To the best of our knowledge, no one has ever
done this before.
While we believe this article delivers a great deal, there are some interesting topics
that are not covered. For example, on the modeling side, it does not propose a solution
to problem of model uncertainty, that is, a theory of robust modeling, if you will. On
the policy design side, it does not analyze real-time estimated policy rules. Nor does
it compare the purportedly robust rules that have been put forward as solutions to
the problems identiﬁed in this paper. These topics are left to future work, some of
which is already in progress.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. The second section begins with a
discussion of the FRB/US model(s) in generic terms, and the historical archives.
The third section compares model properties by vintage, using four models per year,
one for each release of National Income and Product Accounts data. To do this,
we document changes in real-time "model multipliers" and compare them with their
ex post counterparts. We also examine the economic events that coincided with
changes in model properties. The succeeding section computes optimized Taylor-type
rules and compares these to commonly accepted alternative policies in a stochastic
environment. The ﬁfth section examines the stochastic performance of candidate
rules for two selected vintages, the February 1997 and November 2003 models. A
sixth and ﬁnal section sums up and concludes.
2 Thirty vintages of the FRB/US model
2.1 A description of the FRB/US model
The FRB/US model came into production in July 1996 as a replacement for the ven-
erable MIT-Penn-SSRC (MPS) model that had been in use at the Board of Governors
for many years. Disenchantment with MPS had been growing through the 1980s, as
the Board staﬀ saw that the questions they were being asked by senior managers
and Board members were changing in a way that the model was not designed to an-
swer. Straightforward forecasting questions were giving way, more and more, to policy
analysis questions that involved explicit consideration of alternative formulations of
7There have been a number of valuable contributions to the real-time analysis of monetary
policy issues. Most are associated with data and forecasting. See, in particular, the work of
Croushore and Stark (2001) and a whole conference on the subject details of which can be found
at http://www.phil.frb.org/econ/conf/rtdconfpapers.html An additional, deeper layer of real-time
analysis considers revisions to unobservable state variables, such as potential output; on this see
Orphanides et al. (2000) and Orphanides (2001). See also Giannone et al. (2005) for a sophisticated,
real-time analysis of the history of FOMC behavior.
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the design of monetary policy rules, as opposed to discretionary, quarter-to-quarter
settings of the funds rate. At the same time, the academic literature had been posing
important questions about expectations formation and about the identiﬁcation and
interpretation of large-scale macroeconometric models. To address these challenges,
the staﬀ included within the FRB/US model a speciﬁc expectations block, and with
it, a fundamental distinction between intrinsic model dynamics (dynamics that are
immutable to policy) and expectational dynamics (which policy can aﬀect). In most
instances, the intrinsic dynamics of the model were designed around representative
agents choosing optimal paths for decision variables facing polynomial adjustment
costs. The notion of polynomial adjustment costs, a straightforward generalization of
the well-known quadratic adjustment costs, allowed, for example, the ﬂow of invest-
ment to be costly to adjust, and not just the capital stock. This idea, controversial
at the time, has recently been adopted in the broader academic community.8
The structure of macroeconomic models at the Fed have always responded to
economic events and the diﬀerent questions that those events evoke, even before
FRB/US. Brayton, Levin, Tryon and Williams (1997) note, for example, how the
presence of ﬁnancial market regulations meant that for years a substantial portion of
the MPS model dealt speciﬁcally with mortgage credit and ﬁnancial markets more
broadly. The repeal of Regulation Q induced the elimination of much of that detailed
model code. Earlier, the oil price shocks of the 1970s and the collapse of Bretton
Woods gave the model a more international ﬂavor than it had previously. We shall
see that this responsiveness of models to economic conditions and questions continued
with the FRB/US model in the 1990s.
From the outset, FRB/US has been a signiﬁcantly smaller model than was MPS,
b u ti ti ss t i l lq u i t el a r g e .A ti n c e p t i o n ,i tc o n t a i n e ds o m e3 0 0e q u a t i o n sa n di d e n t i -
ties of which perhaps 50 were behavioral. About half of the behavioral equations in
the ﬁrst vintage of the model were modeled using formal speciﬁcations of optimiz-
ing behavior containing explicit estimates of forward expectations and adjustment
costs.9 As already noted, among the identities are equations governing expectations
formation.
Two versions of expectations formation were envisioned: VAR-based expectations
and perfect foresight. The concept of perfect foresight is well understood, but VAR-
based expectations probably requires some explanation. In part, the story has the
ﬂavor of the Phelps-Lucas "island paradigm": agents live on diﬀerent islands where
they have access to a limited set of core macroeconomic variables, knowledge they
share with everyone in the economy. The core macroeconomic variables are the out-
put gap, the inﬂation rate and the federal funds rate, as well as beliefs on the long-run
8Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005), for example, allow the ﬂow of investment to be costly
to adjust which is the same thing as having higher-order adjustment costs for the stock of capital.
9Polynomial adjustment costs in price and volume decision rules. In ﬁnancial markets, intrinsic
adjustment costs were assumed to be zero.
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the long run. These variables comprise the model’s core VAR expectations block. In
addition they have information that is germane to their island, or sector. Consumers,
for example, augment their core VAR model with information about potential out-
put growth and the ratio of household income to GDP, which forms the consumer’s
auxiliary VAR. Two important features of this set-up are worth noting. First, the set
of variables agents are assumed to use in formulating forecasts is restricted to a set
that is much smaller than under rational expectations. Second, agents are allowed
to update their beliefs, but only in a restricted way. In particular, the coeﬃcients of
t h eV A R sa r et a k e na sﬁxed over time, while agents’ perceptions of long-run values
for the inﬂation target and the equilibrium real interest rate are continually updated
using simple learning rules.10
By deﬁnition, under perfect-foresight expectations, the information set is broad-
ened to include all the states in the model with all the cross-equation restrictions
implied by the model.
Typically, the VAR-based expectations version of the model is used for forecast-
ing, and for policy analysis when the staﬀ believes the experiment in question does
not deviate too much from what has been typical in the past so that the average his-
torical experience captured in the VAR can be thought of as representative of what
the response is likely to be under the experiment. The perfect-foresight version is
used for problems in which agents are likely to have the information and motivation
to formulate a detailed understanding of events.11 In the end, with either version,
agents’ decision rules (except with asset prices) usually end up looking like hybrid
New Keynesian model equations.
In this paper, we will be working exclusively with the VAR-based expectations
version of the model. As already mentioned, this is the version that is used for
forecasting and most policy analysis by the Fed staﬀ. Typically it is the multipliers
of this model that are reported to Board members when they ask "what if" questions.
It is also the version of the model for which we have a complete archive of stored
vintages.
There is not the space here for a complete description of the model, a problem
that is exacerbated by the fact that the model is a moving target. Readers interested
in detailed descriptions of the model are invited to consult papers on the subject,
including Brayton and Tinsley (1996), Brayton, Levin, Tryon and Williams (1997),
and Reifschneider, Tetlow and Williams (1999). Our discussion here is more stylized.
10T h i si d e ah a sb e e na r t i c u l a t e da n de x t e n d e di naseries of papers by Kozicki and Tinsley. See,
e.g., their (2001) article.
11Examples of where foresight is regarded as critical include certain kinds of ﬁscal policy inter-
ventions since they involve legislative commitments to future actions that are costly to undo and
for which it pays for agents to make the eﬀort to learn the implications of the legislation.
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∆x = α(L)∆x + Etβ(F)∆x
∗ + c(xt−1 − x
∗
t−1)+ut (1)
where α(L) is a polynomial in the lag operator, i.e., α(L)z = a0+a1zt−1+a2zt−2+
... and β(F) is a polynomial in the lead operator. The term ∆x∗ is the expected
changes in target levels of the generic decision variable, x, c(.) is an error-correction
term, and u is a residual. In general, the theory behind the model will involve cross-
parameter restrictions on α(L),β(F) and c. T h ep o i n tt ob et a k e nf r o me q u a t i o n
(1) is that decisions today for the variable, x, will depend in part on past values and
expected future values, with an eye on bringing x toward its desired value, x∗, over
time.
The main objectives guiding the development of the model were that it be useful
for both forecasting and policy analysis; that expectations be explicit and important
equations representing the decision rules of optimizing agents; that the model be esti-
mated and have satisfactory statistical properties; and that the full-model simulation
properties match the "established rules of thumb regarding economic relationships
under appropriate circumstances."12
Our concern in this paper is the monetary transmission mechanism and how un-
certainty about it can aﬀect policy. The key features inﬂuencing this in the FRB/US
model are the eﬀects of changes in the funds rate on asset prices and from there to
expenditures. Philosophically, the model has not changed much in this area. All
vintages of the model have had expectations of future economic conditions in gen-
eral, and the federal funds rate in particular, aﬀecting long-term interest rates and
inﬂation. From this, real interest rates are determined and this in turn aﬀects stock
prices and exchange rates, and from there, real expenditures. Similarly, the model
has always had a wage-price block, with the same basic features: sticky wages and
prices, expected future excess demand in the goods and labor markets inﬂuencing
price and wage setting, and a channel through which productivity aﬀects real and
nominal wages. That said, as we shall see, there have been substantial changes over
time in both (what we may call) the interest elasticity of aggregate demand and the
eﬀect of excess demand on inﬂation.
Over the years, equations have come and gone in reﬂection of the needs, and
data, of the day. The model began with an automotive sector but this block was
later dropped. Business ﬁxed investment was originally disaggregated into just non-
residential structures and producers’ durable equipment, but the latter is now dis-
aggregated into high-tech equipment and "other". The key consumer decision rules
and wage-price block have undergone frequent modiﬁcation over the period. On the
other hand, the model has always had an equation for consumer non-durables and
services, consumer durables expenditures, and housing. There has always been a
trade block, with aggregate exports and non-oil and oil imports, and equations for
12Brayton and Tinsley (1996), p. 2.
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Cobb-Douglas production function with capital, labor hours and energy as factor
inputs.
2.2 The archive
Since its inception in July 1996, the FRB/US model code, the equation coeﬃcients,
the baseline forecast database, and the list of stochastic shocks with which the model
would be stochastically simulated, have all been stored for each of the eight forecasts
the Board staﬀ conducts every year. In principle, this means that 60 model vintages
are available. In order to match the models to the quarterly frequency of the data, we
elected to use four archives per year, the ones immediately following National Income
and Product Accounts preliminary releases. This ensures that we are considering
models for which data releases may have elicited a signiﬁcant change. There are 30
such vintages with which we can work.13
In what follows, we experiment with each vintage of model, comparing their prop-
erties in selected experiments. Consistent with the real-time philosophy of this en-
deavor, the experiments we choose are typical of those used to assess models by policy
institutions in general and the Federal Reserve Board in particular. They fall into
two broad classes. One set of experiments, model multipliers, attempt to isolate the
behavior of particular parts of the model. A multiplier is the response of a key en-
dogenous variable to an exogenous shock after a ﬁxed period of time. An example is
the response of the unemployment rate after eight quarters to a persistent increase
in the federal funds rate. We shall examine several such multipliers. The other set
of experiments judge the stochastic performance of the model and are designed to
capture the full-model properties under fairly general conditions. So, for example, we
will compute by stochastic simulation the optimal coeﬃcients of a Taylor rule, condi-
tional on a model vintage, a baseline database, and a set of stochastic shocks.14 We
will then compare these optimal rules with other alternative rules and indeed other
alternative worlds deﬁned by the set contained in our model vintages. To the extent
that any of these givens turn out not to be representative of the ex post experience,
the ex ante optimal Taylor rule will turn out not to be optimal ex post.
The archives document model changes and provide a unique record of model
uncertainty. As we shall see, the answers to questions a policy maker might ask are
13The archives are listed by the precise date of the FOMC meeting in which the forecasts were
discussed. For our purposes, we do not need to be so precise so we shall describe them by month
and year. Thus, the 30 vintages we use are, in 1996: July and November; in 1997: February, May,
July, and November; in 1998 through 2000: February, May, August and November; and in 2001
through 2003: January, May, August and November.
14Each vintage has a list of variables that are shocked using bootstrap methods for stochastic
simulations. The list of shocks is a subset of the model’s complete set of residuals since other
residuals are treated not as shocks but rather as measurement error. The precise nature of the
shocks will vary according to data construction and the period over which the shocks are drawn.
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output cost of bringing down inﬂation, for example, can be subdivided into several
more precise questions, including: (i) what would the model say is the output cost of
bringing down inﬂation today?; (ii) what would the model of today say the output
cost of bringing down inﬂation would have been in February 1997?; and (iii) what
would the model have said in February 1997 was the output cost of disinﬂation at
that time? These questions introduce a time dependency to the issue that rarely
appears in other contexts.
The answers to these and other related questions depend on the model vintage.
Here, however, the model vintage means more than just the model alone. Depending
on the question, the answer can depend on the baseline; that is, on the initial condi-
tions from which a given experiment is carried out. It can also depend on the way an
experiment is carried out, and in particular on the policy rule that is in force. And
since models are evaluated in terms of their stochastic performance, it can depend
on the stochastic shocks to which the model is subjected to judge the appropriate
policy and to assess performance. So in the most general case, model uncertainty in
our context comes from four interrelated sources: model, policy rule, baseline and
stochastic shocks.
How much model variability can there be over a period of just eight years? The
answer is a surprisingly large amount. But to provide a speciﬁca n s w e r ,l e tu sb e g i n
with the data. It is ultimately the data that underlie changes in the model, changes
in the stochastic shocks, and changes in the policy rules that react to those shocks
and control the model. In the spirit of Orphanides (2001), let us begin by examining
measures of historical data by vintage. Figure 1 shows the four-quarter growth rate
of the GDP price index, for selected vintages. (Note we show only real-time historical
data because of rules forbidding the publication of forecast data more recent than in
the last ﬁve years.) The inﬂation rate moves around some, but the various vintages
for the most part are highly correlated. That said, our reading of the literature is
that data uncertainty, narrowly deﬁned to include revisions of published data series,
is not a ﬁrst-order source of problems for monetary policy design; see, e.g., Croushore
and Stark (2001). As argued by Orphanides et al. (2000) and Orphanides (2001),
unobservable variables like potential output are, or at least may be, another story.
Figure 2 shows the more empirically important case of model measures of growth in
adjusted15 potential non-farm business output. Unlike the case of inﬂation, potential
output growth is a latent variable the deﬁnition and interpretation of which depends
on model concepts. What this means is the historical measures of potential are
themselves a part of the model—so we should expect signiﬁcant revisions.16 Even so,
15The "adjustment" in adjusted non-farm business output is to exclude owner occupied housing,
and to include oil imports. This makes output conformable with the model’s production function
which includes oil as a factor of production. Henceforth it should be understood that all references to
productivity or potential output are to the concept measured in terms of adjusted non-farm business
output.
16Deﬁned in this way, data uncertainty does not include uncertainty in the measurement of latent
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1996 vintage shows growth in potential output of about 2 percent. For the next
several years, succeeding vintages show both higher potential output growth rates
and more responsiveness to economic developments. By January 2001, growth in
potential was estimated at over 5 percent for some dates, before subsequent changes
resulted in a path that was lower and more variable. Why might this be? Table 1
reminds us about how extraordinary the late 1990s were. The table shows selected
FRB/US model forecasts for the four-quarter growth in GDP over the period for which
public availability of the data are not restricted.17 The table shows the substantial
underprediction of GDP growth over the period, an experience that was common
among forecasters. .
Table 1
Q4 growth in GDP: selected FRB/US model forecasts
forecast date forecast ﬁnal data actual less ﬁnal
July 1996 2.2 4.8 2.6
July 1997 2.0 3.7 1.7
Aug.1998 3.0 4.4 1.4
Aug.1999 3.2 3.6 0.4
4Q ahead GDP growth forecasts from the third-quarter vintage of the
year shown compared against ﬁnal data.
The most recent historical measures shown in Figure 2 are for the August 2002
vintage, where the path for potential output growth diﬀers in two important ways
from the others. The ﬁrst way is that it is the only series that is less optimistic than
earlier ones. In part, this reﬂects the onset of the 2001 recession. The second way
the series diﬀe r si si ni t sv o l a t i l i t yo v e rt i m e .T h i si sam a n i f e s t a t i o no ft h eo n g o i n g
evolution of the model in response to emerging economic conditions. In its early
vintages, the modeling of potential output in FRB/US was traditional for large-
scale econometric models, in that trend labor productivity and trend labor input,
were based on exogenous split time trends. In essence, the model took the typical
Keynesian view that nearly all shocks aﬀecting aggregate output were demand-side
phenomena. Then, as under-predictions of GDP growth were experienced, without
concomitant underpredictions in inﬂation, these priors were updated. The staﬀ began
adding model code to allow the supply side of the model to respond to output surprises
by projecting forward revised proﬁles for productivity growth.
The appendix documents in some detail the evolution of the supply block of
variables, like potential output. The important conceptual distinction between the two is that
eventually one knows what the ﬁnal data series is—what "the truth" is—when dealing with data
uncertainty. One never knows, even long after the fact, what the true values of latent variables are.
Latent variables are more akin to parameter uncertainty than data uncertainty.
17A record such as the one in the table was not unusual during this period; the Survey of Profes-
sional Forecasters similarly underpredicted output growth.
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underpredictions were met with shifts in the deterministic paths of latent variables
like the NAIRU and trend labor productivity. Stochastic elements of determinants
of aggregate supply made their introduction in the August 1998 vintage. The ﬁrst
change was a relatively modest one, allowing stochastic trends in the labor force
participation rate. More stochastic trends were to follow. Beginning with the May
2001 vintage, a production function accounting approach was adopted which allowed
capital services to play a direct role in the evolution of potential, with stochastic
trends in the average work week, the participation rate and in trend total factor
productivity. The evolution from a nearly deterministic view of potential output to
a stochastic view was complete. Among other things, this change in view manifests
itself in more volatile measures of potential growth—and more ex post correlation
between potential and actual output growth—just as the path for the August 2002
vintage shows.
Despite the volatility of potential output growth, the resulting output gaps, shown
in Figure 3, show considerable covariation, albeit with non-trivial revisions. This ob-
servation underscores the often underappreciated fact that resource utilization (that
is, output gaps or unemployment) is not the sole driver of ﬂuctuations in inﬂation;
other forces are also at work, including trend productivity which aﬀects unit labor
costs, and relative price shocks such those aﬀecting food, energy and non-oil import
prices.
Figures 4a and 4b—which are really one ﬁgure spread over two pages—provide a
helicopter tour of the model’s changes over time along with reminders of some of
t h ee v e n t so ft h a te r a . T h ec h a r ta c r o s st h et o ps h o w st w ot h i n g s :t h et o t a ln u m -
ber of equation changes by vintage (the red bars, measured oﬀ the left-hand scale),
and the total number of model equations, including identities (the blue line and the
right-hand scale). Three facts immediately arise from the picture. First, there have
been ﬂurries of numerous changes in the model. Second, the number of changes has
tended to decrease over time.18 And third, the number of equations has increased,
particularly in the period from 2000 to 2002. The fact that many model changes were
undertaken early in the model’s history but without adding to the size of the model
while fewer changes were adopted later on that nonetheless added to the model’s size
suggests that early period was one of model shakedown while the latter period was
one of revision. Indeed, during the period from about 1998 to 2002, the range of
questions that the model was expected to address increased, and the staﬀ’s view of
the economy became more complicated.
18A "model change" is the non-trivial addition, deletion or change in speciﬁcation of a "signiﬁcant"
model equation from the vintage immediately preceding. Re-estimation of a given equation does not
count as a model change. Rewriting an equation in a mathematically equivalent way also does not
count. In a fully articulated model with a large number of identities, changes in structural equations
can oblige corresponding changes in a large number of associated identities. As a result, the count
of model changes mounts rapidly.
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page, some of the model changes incurred over the period, while in the left-hand
columns we identify some noteworthy economic events of the era. The entries in the
left-hand columns are marked by a number, with a corresponding entry appearing
in the appropriate place, in the same color, in the chart; the right-hand columns are
similarly marked, in this case by a letter.
The table lists a number of economic events over the past decade that inﬂuenced
the questions asked of the model, and even in many cases prompted changes to its
speciﬁcation. The stock market was already booming in July 1996, when the model
was brought into service. By the end of the year, the model’s stock market equa-
tion and the consumption and housing equations that stock market wealth aﬀect had
been changed. The most signiﬁcant changes came, however, as the lasting implica-
tions of the productivity boom became prominent. In December 1999, as a part of
the comprehensive revisions to the National Income and Product Accounts, software
was added to the measurement of the capital stock.19 Investment expenditures—
particularly expenditures on information technology—boomed over the same period
as did stock market valuations. By late 1999, it became clear that machinery and
equipment expenditures would have to be disaggregated into high-tech and "other".
The boom also engendered other questions: what is the eﬀect of an acceleration in
productivity on the equilibrium real interest rate and on the savings rate? What are
the implications of a permanent shift in the relative price of computer equipment?
These and other questions resulted in a reformulation of the model’s supply side. The
unifying theme of the questions of the time was an reorientation toward more longer
run or lower frequency questions than had previously been the case. The introduc-
tion of chain-weighted data in late 1996 made modeling these low-frequency trends
feasible in a way that had not been the case before.20 The point is that changes to
the model were not always a reﬂection of the model underperforming at the tasks it
was originally built to do; in many instances, it was an outcome of an expansion of
the tasks to which the model was assigned.
To summarize this section, the FRB/US model archives show considerable change
in equations and the data by vintage. The next section examines the extent to which
these diﬀerences manifest themselves in diﬀerent model properties. The following
section then examines how these diﬀerences, together with their associated stochastic
shock sets, imply diﬀerent optimal monetary policy rules.
19Prior to that time, expenditures on software were regarded as an intermediate input; they had
no direct eﬀect on GDP.
20In the absence of chain-weighting, trends in relative prices, like the relative price of high-tech
capital goods, could not be modeled well. The inability to account for weight shifts in expenditure
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In this subsection, we consider the variation in real time of selected model multipliers.
In most instances, we are interested in the response after 8 quarters of unemployment
to a given shock, (although our ﬁrst experiment is an exception to this rule). We
choose unemployment as our response variable because it is one of the two key real
variables that the Fed has concerned itself with over the years, and the other, the
output gap, has changed deﬁnitions over time. We would like to avoid diﬀerences in
multipliers that arise solely from changes in deﬁnitions. The horizon of eight quarters
is a typical one for exercises such as this as conducted at the Fed and other policy
institutions. Except where otherwise noted, we hold the nominal federal funds rate
at baseline for each of these experiments.
It is easiest to show the results graphically. But before turning to speciﬁc results,
it is useful to outline how these ﬁgures are constructed and how they should be
interpreted. In all cases, we show two lines. The black solid line is the real-time
multiplier by vintage. Each point on the line represents the outcome of the same
experiment, conducted on the model vintage of that date, using the baseline database
at that point in history. So at each point shown by the black line, the model, its
coeﬃcients and the baseline all diﬀer. The red dashed line shows what we call the
ex post multiplier. The ex post m u l t i p l i e ri sc o m p u t e du s i n gt h em o s tr e c e n tm o d e l
vintage for each date; the only thing that changes for each point on the dashed red
line is the initial conditions under which the experiment is conducted. Diﬀerences
over time in the red line reveal the extent to which the model is nonlinear, because
the multipliers for linear models are independent of initial conditions.
Now let us look at Figure 5, which shows the 5-year employment sacriﬁce ratio;
that is, the cost in terms of cumulative annualized forgone employment, that a one-
percentage-point reduction in the inﬂation rate would cost after ﬁve years.21 Let us
f o c u so nt h er e dd a s h e dl i n eﬁrst. It shows that for the November 2003 model, the
sacriﬁce ratio is essentially constant over time. So if the staﬀ were asked to assess
the sacriﬁce ratio, or what the sacriﬁce ratio would have been in, say, February 1997,
the answer based on the November 2003 model would be the same: about 4-1/4,
meaning that it would take that many percentage-point-years of unemployment to
bring down inﬂation by one percent. Now, however, look at the black solid line. Since
each point on the line represents a diﬀerent model, and the last point on the far right
of the line is the November 2003 model, the red dashed line and the black solid line
must meet at the right-hand side in this and all other ﬁgures in this section. But
notice how much the real-time sacriﬁce ratio has changed over the 8-year period of
study. Had the model builders been asked in February 1997 what the sacriﬁce ratio
21More precisely, the experiment is conducted by simulation, setting the target rate of inﬂation
in a Taylor rule to one percentage point below its baseline level, and setting the feedback coeﬃcient
on the output gap to zero. The sacriﬁce ratio is cumulative annualized change in the unemployment
rate, undiscounted, relative to baseline, divided by the change in PCE inﬂation after 5 years.
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approximately half the November 2003 answer. The black line undulates a bit, but
cutting through the wiggles, there is a general upward creep over time, and a fairly
discrete jump in the sacriﬁce ratio in late 2001.22
T h ec l i m bi nt h em o d e ls a c r i ﬁce ratio is striking, particularly as it was incurred
over such a short period of time among model vintages with substantial overlap in
their estimation periods. One might be forgiven for thinking that this phenomenon
is idiosyncratic to the model under study. On this, two facts should be noted. First,
even if it were idiosyncratic such a reaction misses the point. The point here is
that this is perhaps the principal model that was used by the Fed staﬀ and it was
constructed with all due diligence to address the sort of questions asked here. Second,
other work shows that this result is not a ﬂuke.23
Figure 6 shows the funds-rate multiplier; that is, the increase in the unemployment
rate after eight quarters in response to a persistent 100-basis-point increase in the
funds rate. This time, the red dashed line shows important time variation: the ex
post funds rate multiplier varies with initial conditions, it is highest at a bit over
1 percentage point in late 2000, and lowest at the beginning and at the end of the
period. The nonlinearity stems entirely from the speciﬁcation of the model’s stock
market equation. In this vintage of the model, the equation is written in levels, rather
than in logs, which makes the interest elasticity of aggregate demand an increasing
function of the share of stock market wealth to total wealth. The mechanism is that
an increase in the funds rate raises long-term bond rates, which in turn bring about a
drop in stock market valuation operating through the arbitrage relationship between
expected risk-adjusted bond and equity returns. The larger the stock market, the
stronger the eﬀect.24
The real-time multiplier, shown by the solid black line is harder to characterize.
Two observations stand out. The ﬁrst is the sheer volatility of the multiplier. In a
large-scale model such as the FRB/US model, where the transmission of monetary
22The sizable jump in the sacriﬁce ratio in late 2001 is associated with a shift to estimating the
models principle wage and price equations simultaneously together with other equations to represent
the rest of the economy, including a Taylor rule for policy. Among other things, this allowed
expectations formation in wage and price setting decisions to reﬂect more recent Fed behavior than
the full core VAR equations that are used in the rest of the model.
23In particular, the same phenomenon occurs to varying degrees in simple single-equation Phillips
curves of various speciﬁcations using both real-time and ex post data; see Tetlow (2005b). Roberts
(2004) shows how greater discipline in monetary policy may have contributed to the reduction in
economic volatility in the period since the Volcker disinﬂation. Cogley and Sargent (2004) use
Bayesian techniques to estimate two Phillips curves and an aggregate supply curve simultaneously
asking why the Fed did not choose an inﬂation stabilizing policy before the Volcker disinﬂation.
They too ﬁnd time variation in the (reduced-form) output cost of disinﬂation.
24The levels relationship of the stock market equation means that the wealth eﬀect of the stock
market on consumption can be measured in the familiar "cents per dollar" form (of incremental
stock market wealth). Also playing a role is the log-linearity (that is, constant elasticity) of the
relationship between wealth and consumption.
24
ECB
Working Paper Series No 610
April 2006Figure 5: Sacriﬁce ratio by model vintage
25
ECB
Working Paper Series No 610
April 2006policy operates through a number of channels, time variation in the interest elasticity
of aggregate demand depends on a large variety of parameters. Second, the real-time
multiplier is almost always lower than the ex post multiplier. The gap between the two
is particularly marked in 2000, when the business cycle reached a peak, as did stock
prices. At the time, concerns about possible stock market bubbles were rampant.
One aspect of the debate between proponents and detractors of the active approach
to stock market bubbles concerns the feasibility of policy prescriptions in a world
of model uncertainty.25 And in fact, there were three increases in the federal funds
rate during 2000, totalling 100 basis points.26 T h ec o n s i d e r a b l ed i ﬀerence between
the real-time and ex post multipliers during this period demonstrates the diﬃculty
in carrying out historical analyses of the role of monetary policy; today’s assessment
of the strength of monetary policy transmission mechanism can diﬀer substantially
from what the staﬀ thought at the time.
Figure 7 shows the government expenditure multiplier—the eﬀect on the unem-
ployment rate of a persistent increase in government spending of 1 percent of GDP.
Noting that the sign on this multiplier is negative, one aspect of this ﬁgure is the
same as the previous one: the real-time multiplier is nearly always smaller (in ab-
solute terms) than ex post multiplier. If we take the ex post multiplier as correct,
this says that policy advice based on the real-time FRB/US estimates through recent
history would have routinely understated the extent to which perturbations in ﬁscal
policy would oblige an oﬀsetting monetary policy response. Given that the period of
study involved a substantial change in the stance of ﬁscal policy, this is an important
observation. A second aspect of the ﬁgure is the near-term reduction in the ex post
multiplier, from about -0.9 in the 1990s, to about -0.75 in this decade.
Lastly, Figure 8 shows the eﬀects on unemployment of a persistent change in the
trend growth rate of productivity. In this instance, the forementioned non-linearity
inﬂuences the ex post multiplier. The shock has its largest eﬀects on unemployment
when the stock market is a large proportion of household wealth. Somewhat sur-
prisingly, given the ﬂurry of respeciﬁcations that the productivity boom elicited in
the late 1990s, the real-time multiplier diﬀers from the ex post multiplier in only
relatively modest ways. Evidently, it is the incidence, and real-time recognition, of
productivity shocks rather than their short-term eﬀects that were problematic for
the model. As we have already noted, and the appendix shows, the speciﬁcation of
the model’s supply side in the 1990s reﬂected a strong prior belief that ﬂuctuations
in output originated from demand shocks; it took human intervention to assign a
forecast error to a persistent supply shock. This view gave way to a more stochastic
25The "active approach" to the presence of stock market bubbles argues that monetary policy
should speciﬁcally respond to bubbles. See, e.g., Cecchetti et al. (2000). The passive approach
argues that bubbles should aﬀect monetary policy only insofar as they aﬀect the forecast for inﬂation
and possibly output. They should not be a special object of policy. See, Bernanke et al. (1999,
2001), and Tetlow (2004a).
26The intended federal funds rate was raised 25 basis points on February 2, 2000, to 5-3/4 percent;
by a further 25 basis points on March 21, and by 50 basis points on May 16, to 6-1/2 percent.
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view of aggregate supply determination at the turn of the decade.
To summarize this section, real-time multipliers show substantial variation over
time, and diﬀer considerably from what one would say exp o s tthe multipliers would
be. Moreover, the discrepancies between the two multiplier concepts have often been
large at critical junctures in recent economic history. It follows that real-time model
uncertainty is an important problem for policy makers. The next section quantiﬁes
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4.1 Optimized Taylor rules
One way to quantify the importance of model uncertainty for monetary policy is to
examine how policy advice would diﬀer depending on the model. A popular device
for providing policy advice is with the prescribed paths for interest rates from simple
monetary policy rules, like the rule proposed by Taylor (1993) and Henderson and
McKibbin (1993). A straightforward way to do this is to compute optimized Taylor
(1993) rules. Many central banks use simple rules of one sort or another in the assess-
ment of monetary policy and for formulating policy advice. Because they react to
only those variables that would be key in a wide set of models, simple rules are said to
be robust to misspeciﬁcation. In addition, Giannone et al. (2005) show that the good
ﬁt of simple two-argument Taylor-type rules can be attributed to the small number
of fundamental factors driving the U.S. economy; that is, the two arguments that
appear in Taylor rules encompass all that one needs to know to summarize monetary
policy in history. Thus, optimized Taylor rules would appear to be an ideal vehicle
for study.
Formally, a Taylor rule is optimized by choosing the parameters of the rule, Φ =
{αY,α Π} to minimize a loss function subject to a given model, x = f(·), and a given
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where x is a vector of endogenous variables, and z a vector of exogenous variables,
both in logs, except for those variables measured in rates, π is the inﬂation rate,
e π = Σ3
i=0πt−i/4 is the four-quarter moving average of inﬂation, π∗ is the target rate
of inﬂation, y is (the log of) output; y∗ is potential output, and r is the federal funds
rate. Trivially, it is true that: π,π∗,y,y∗,∆r ∈ x.27,28 In principle, the loss function,
27The fact that the policy rule depends on the variance-covariance matrix of stochastic shocks
means that the rule is not certainty equivalent. This is the case for two reasons. One is the non-
linearity of the model. The other is the fact that the rule is a simple one: it does not include all the
states of the model.
28The intercept used in the model’s Taylor rule, designated rr∗, is a medium-term proxy for the
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function for the FRB/US model. However, it is technically infeasible for a model the
size of FRB/US. That said, with the possible exception of the term penalizing the
change in the federal funds rate, the arguments to 2 are standard. The penalty on
the change in the funds rate may be thought of as representing either a hedge against
model uncertainty by the Fed, which may wish to reduce the likelihood of the fed
f u n d sr a t ee n t e r i n gr a n g e sb e y o n dt h o s ef o rw h i c ht h em o d e lw a se s t i m a t e d ,o ra sa
pure preference of the Committee. Whatever the reason for its presence, the literature
conﬁrms that some penalty is needed to explain the historical persistence of monetary
policy; see, e.g., Sack and Wieland (2000) and Rudebusch (2001).
Solving a problem like this can be done easily for linear models. FRB/US is,
however, a non-linear model. We therefore compute the optimized rule by stochastic
simulation. Speciﬁcally, each vintage of the model is subjected to bootstrapped shocks
from its stochastic shock archive. Historical shocks from the estimation period of the
key behavioral equations are drawn.29 In all, 400 draws of 80 periods each are used
for each vintage to evaluate candidate parameterizations, with a simplex method used
to determine the search direction.
This is obviously a very computationally intensive exercise and so we are limited
in the range of preferences we can investigate. Accordingly, we discuss only for one set
of preferences: equal weights on output, inﬂation and the change in the federal funds
rate. The choice is arbitrary but does have the virtue of matching the preferences
that have been used in policy optimization experiments carried out for the FOMC;
see Svensson and Tetlow (2005).
The results of this exercise can be summarized graphically. In Figure 9, the green
solid line is the optimized coeﬃcient on inﬂation, αΠ, while the blue dashed line is
feedback coeﬃcient on the output gap, αY. The response to inﬂation is universally
low, never reaching the 0.5 of the traditional Taylor (1993) rule.30 By and large, there
is relatively little time variation in the inﬂation response coeﬃcient. The output gap
coeﬃcient is another story. It too starts out low with the ﬁrst vintage in July 1996
at about 0.2, but then rises almost steadily thereafter, reaching a peak of nearly
1w i t ht h el a s tv i n t a g ei nN o v e m b e r2 0 0 3 . T h e r ei sa l s oas h a r pj u m pi nt h eg a p
coeﬃcient over the ﬁrst two quarters of 2001. One might be tempted to think that
this is related to the jump in the sacriﬁc er a t i o ,s h o w ni nF i g u r e5 . I nf a c t ,t h e
equilibrium real interest rate. It is an endogenous variable in the model. In particular, rr∗
t =
(1−γ)rr∗
t−1 +γ(rnt −πt) where r is the federal funds rate, and γ=0.05. As a robustness check, we
experimented with adding a constant in the optimized rules in addition to rr∗ and found that this
term was virtually zero for every model vintage.
29The number of shocks used for stochastic simulations has varied with the vintage, and generally
has grown. For the ﬁrst vintage, 43 shocks were used, while for the November 2003 vintage, 75 were
used.
30That said, the measure of inﬂation diﬀers here. In keeping with the tradition of inﬂation
targeting countries, we use the rate of the change in the PCE price index as the inﬂation rate of
interest. Taylor (1993) used the GDP price deﬂator.
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increase in the gap coeﬃcient coincided with the inclusion of a new investment block
in the model, which in conjunction with the supply block of the model, tightened the
relationship between supply-side disturbances and subsequent eﬀects on aggregate
demand, particularly over the longer term.31 The new investment block, in turn,
was driven by two factors: the addition by the Bureau of Economic Analysis a year
earlier of software in the deﬁnition of equipment spending and the capital stock, and
associated new appreciation, on the part of the staﬀ, of the importance of the ongoing
productivity and investment boom. In any case, while the upward jump in the gap
coeﬃcient stands out, it bears recognizing that the rise in the gap coeﬃcient was a
continual process.32
4.2 Ex post optimal policies
Figure 9 showed the optimized Taylor rules. These policies were optimal given the
parameterization of the rule and the average incidence of shocks as measured by
the bootstrapped residuals. What is optimal, however, is always conditional on the
maintained assumptions of the exercise. Most of this paper has been about model
u n c e r t a i n t y .U n c e r t a i n t ya b o u tt h es h o c k so n em i g h tb ee x p e c t e dt of a c ei sa l s oa n
issue and indeed the rethinking of these shocks can be a driver of model respeciﬁca-
tions. In an eﬀort to examine this question, this subsection considers the Taylor-rule
coeﬃcients that would be optimal had the Fed known the precise sequence of shocks
they were to experience over the 30 years prior to the vintage date. Whereas the
coeﬃcients in Figure 9 were chosen to minimize the loss function, (2), over boot-
strapped draws of the residuals, here we pick the optimal coeﬃcients to minimize the
same loss function, over the same periods, but for the one sequence of draws that was
actually experienced. In this way, Figure 9 can be thought of as the ex ante optimal
coeﬃcients, so called because those coeﬃcients are optimal given that the Fed does
not know the precise sequence of shocks, and here we will look at ex post optimal
coeﬃcients.
Obviously, the idea of an ex post o p t i m a lr u l ei sa na r t i ﬁcial concept. It assumes
information that no one could have. Moreover, if one did have such information (and
31In essence, the linkage between a disturbance to total factor productivity and the desired capital
stock in the future was clariﬁed and strengthened so that an increase in TFP that may produce
excess supply in the very short run can be expected to produce an investment-led period of excess
demand later on.
32We conducted a similar exercise for so-called extended Taylor rules that include a term in the
lagged federal funds rate. The results were essentially the same. In particular, the coeﬃcient on the
lagged fed funds rate was about 0.2 regardless of the vintage, and the coeﬃcients on inﬂation and
the output gap were slightly lower than in Figure 9, about enough to result in the same long-run
elasticity. This result is consistent with the ﬁnding of Rudebusch (2001) for the Rudebusch-Svensson
model, but diﬀers from that of Williams (2003) for a linearized rational expectations version of the
FRB/US model. The reason is that without rational expectations, the eﬃcacy of "promising" future
settings of the funds rate through instrument smoothing is impaired.
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to a simple rule like the Taylor rule. Instead, one would choose precise values of
the funds rate, period by period, to minimize the loss function. Our purpose here
is to demonstrate the beneﬁts of better information. Later on, we shall look at the
other side of the coin by examining the costs of the hubris of believing too much.
It is also worth noting that since the ex post optimal rules are conditional on just a
single "draw" of shocks, they will tend to be sensitive to relatively small changes in
speciﬁcation or shocks and will vary a great deal from vintage to vintage.
The results are shown in Figure 10 and can be compared with those in Figure 9.
It is worthwhile to divide the results into two parts, demarcated by vintage: the 1990s
and the new century. Volatility aside, the ex post optimal output gap coeﬃcients are
mostly lower than the ex ante optimal ones, and the inﬂation coeﬃcients are mostly
higher. In the new century, the inﬂation and output gap coeﬃcients rise more-or-less
continuously in Figure 10. Thus the ex ante, ex post and estimated coeﬃcients have
a broadly similar pattern in the new century, albeit with diﬀerences in magnitude.
Of particular interest given the recent literature on the subject is the response to
the output gap. Figure 11 shows the real-time output gap coeﬃcients for the ex ante
optimal coeﬃcients (the green solid line) and the ex post o p t i m a l( t h eb l u ed a s h e d
line). In broad terms, the two lines share some features. Both are low (on average) in
t h ee a r l yp e r i o d ;b o t hc l i m bs t e e p l ya tt h et u r no ft h ec e n t u r y ,a n db o t hc o n t i n u et o
climb thereafter, albeit more slowly. But there are interesting diﬀerences as well, with
1999 being a particularly noteworthy period. This was a period where critics of the
F e da r g u e dt h a tp o l i c yw a st o oe a s y .T h ec o n t e x tw a st h et h r e e2 5 - b a s i s - p o i n tc u t s
in the funds rate undertaken in 1998 in response to the Asia crisis and the Russian
debt default. At the time, a sharp increase in investor perceptions of risk coupled
with deterioration in global ﬁnancial conditions raised fears of an imminent global
credit crunch, concerns that played an important role in Fed decision making. By
1999, however, these factors had abated and so the FOMC starting "taking back" the
previous decreases. To some, including Cecchetti et al. (2000) and Mussa (2003) the
easier stance undertaken in late 1998 and into 1999 exacerbated the speculative stock
market boom of that time and may have ampliﬁed the ensuing recession.33 The ex
post optimal feedback on the output gap, shown by the blue dashed line, was volatile.
For the 1999 models, and given the particular shocks over the period shown in the
picture, the optimal response to the gap was zero; but within months, it rose to about
0.4. In contrast, the ex ante optimal coeﬃcients were essentially unchanged over the
same period, as were the more important multipliers, which indicates that changes
in the shocks were critical. Given that the shock sets in 1999 and 2000 overlap, this
is a noteworthy change. To us, the important point to take from this is not the
proper stance of policy at that point in history, but rather that it is so dependent on
seemingly small changes. Our analysis also hints at some advantages of discretion:
33In his memoir of his time on the Board of Governors, Lawrence Meyer considers this argument
and mostly rejects it. See Meyer (2004), especially chapter 7.
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the willingness to respond to the speciﬁc shocks of the day—if one is able to discern
them. We shall have more to say about this a bit later.
5P e r f o r m a n c e
To this point, we have compared model properties and the policies that those proper-
ties prescribe. Notwithstanding having speciﬁe dal o s sf u n c t i o n ,w eh a v eh a dn o t h i n g
directly to say about performance. This section ﬁlls this void.
In the ﬁrst subsection, we investigate how useful prior information about the
sequence of shocks might be for policy and hence welfare. Speciﬁcally, we conduct
counterfactual experiments on the single sequence of shocks immediately preceding
each model vintage. Thus, this subsection is the performance counterpart to the
design subsection of optimal ex post policies. It tells us the beneﬁto fb e i n gr i g h t
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5.2 , we consider the performance, on average of the model economies under stochastic
simulation. The exercise in subsection 5.2 is a counterpart to the ex ante optimized
policy rules in Figure 9. Among other things, it will tell us about the cost of being
wrong in our beliefs about knowledge of the shocks.
5.1 Performance in retrospect: counterfactual experiments
If the ex post optimal rule really would have been optimal for each vintage of the
model—conditional, of course, on that model—how much better would it have been
than, say, the ex ante optimal rule? In other words, how valuable is that kind of
information for the design of policy? We answer this question with a counterfactual
simulation on selected model vintages. To facilitate comparison with the next sub-
section and still keep the size of the problem manageable, we restrict our attention
to just two of our 30 model vintages. For this purpose, we elect to use the February
1997 and the November 2003 models. These were chosen because they were far apart
in time, thereby reﬂecting as diﬀerent views of the world as this environment allows,
and because their properties are the most diﬀerent of any in the set. In particular,
the February 1997 model has the lowest sacriﬁce ratio of all vintages considered, and
the November 2003 model has the highest. It follows that these two models should
more-or-less encompass the results of other vintages.
The details of our simulation are straightforward: each simulation is initialized
with the conditions as of 20 years and two quarters before the vintage itself, as
measured by that model vintage and ends two quarters before the vintage date. The
Fed is assumed to be able to control the funds rate perfectly, doing so with the policy
rule in question. The model is subjected to those shocks that the economy bore over
the period, as measured by the relevant model vintage. The loss in each instance
is measured using the same loss function as in the optimization exercises, (2). The
losses are then normalized such that the historical path represents a loss of unity. All
other losses can be interpreted in terms of percentage deviations from the baseline
loss.
The results are shown in Table 2 below. Let us focus for the time being on the left-
hand panel with the results for the February 1997 model. To aid in the interpretation
of the results, the policy rule’s coeﬃcients are shown, where applicable. According
to the model, the ex post optimal policy would have been superior to the historical
policy. This is perhaps not all that surprising, since the ex post optimal policy has the
beneﬁt of "seeing" the shocks before they occur, although this advantage is mitigated
b yt h ec o n s t r a i n t — n o tf a c e db yt h eF e d — t h a tt h eex post optimal policy responds only
to the output gap and the inﬂation rate. For this vintage, knowing the shocks turns
o u tt ob ev e r yu s e f u li n d e e d :t h eex post policy does better—almost twice as well—as
37
ECB
Working Paper Series No 610
April 2006the historical policy.34 However, the traditional Taylor rule also outperforms the
historical policy. By contrast, the ex ante optimal policy does a fair amount worse.
W h a tb o t ht h eT a y l o rr u l ea n dt h eex post optimal policy share is stronger responses
in general, and to inﬂation in particular, than the ex ante optimal policy. Evidently,
the average sequence of shocks that conditions the ex ante optimal policy was less
inﬂationary than the actual sequence.
Table 2
Normalized model performance in counterfactual simulation∗
February 1997 vintage November 2003 vintage
απ αy Lα π αy L
Historical policy - - 1 - - 1
Ex post optimal 0.94 0.33 0.56 0.78 1.31 2.25
Ex ante optimal 0.18 0.25 1.80 0.30 1.07 4.17
Taylor rule 0.50 0.50 0.74 0.50 0.50 10.79
* Selected rules and model vintages. Using the estimated shocks over 20 years.
The right-hand panel shows the results for the November 2003 vintage of the
model. Here the results are much diﬀerent, and surprising. The historical policy
is substantially better than any of the alternative candidates. This suggests that
responding to just two variables is insuﬃcient for the shocks borne during this period.
If the best two coeﬃcients of the ex post optimal policy were less than ideal, the
b a s i cT a y l o rr u l ea n dt h eex ante policy should do worse, and indeed they do: much
worse. The lower the feedback on the output gap in these scenarios, the poorer the
performance. With a bit of reﬂection, the reasons for this should not be surprising:
the shocks during this period included shocks to the growth rate of potential output,
as outlined in Figure 3 above. Such shocks manifest themselves in more variables
than just the output gap and inﬂation. Indeed, the short-run impact of an increase
in productivity is to reduce inﬂation and raise output, leading to oﬀsetting eﬀects on
policy. However as time goes by, the higher growth rate of productivity raises the
desired capital stock thereby increasing the equilibrium real interest rate. The Taylor
rule and its cousins are ill designed to handle such phenomena.
5.2 Performance on average: stochastic simulations
Another way that we can assess candidate policies is by conducting stochastic sim-
ulations of the various model vintages under the control of the candidate rules and
evaluating the loss function. We do this here. We subject both of these models to
same set of stochastic shocks as in the ex ante optimization exercise. Under these
34That said, as we noted before, the performance comparison assumes preferences that may not
match the FOMC’s preferences, although they are arguably very reasonable preferences.
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case, we normalize the loss under the ex ante optimal policy to unity. The results are
shown in Table 3.
Table 3
Normalized model performance under stochastic simulation∗
February 1997 vintage November 2003 vintage
απ αy Lα π αy L
Ex ante optimal 0.18 0.25 1 0.30 1.07 1
Ex post optimal 0.94 0.33 1.76 0.78 1.31 4.19
Taylor rule 0.50 0.50 1.33 0.50 0.50 1.49
* Selected rules and model vintages. 400 draws of 80 periods each.
For the moment, let us focus on the left-hand panel, with the results for the
February 1997 model; once again, we show the coeﬃcients of the candidate rules for
easy reference. The ex ante optimal coeﬃcients are both low, at about 0.2. The
ex post optimal coeﬃcients are higher, particularly for inﬂation. However, the table
shows that applying the policy that was optimal for the particular sequence of shocks
to the average sequence, selected from the same set of shocks, would have been
somewhat injurious to policy performance, with a loss that is 76 percent higher. The
Taylor rule prescribes stronger feedback on output but weaker feedback on inﬂation,
than the ex ante optimal policy. The fact that the loss under the Taylor rule is
approximately midway between that of the ex ante and ex post r u l e ss u g g e s t st h a ti t
i st h er e s p o n s et oi n ﬂation that is the key to performance for this model vintage and
the corresponding shock set. Still, in broad terms, none of the rules considered here
performs too badly for this vintage.
The results for the November 2003 vintage, shown in the right-hand panel, are
in some ways more interesting. Recall that in Table 2 we showed that the ex post
optimal rule performed approximately twice as well as the ex ante optimal rule for
the particular sequence of shocks studied. Here it is shown that this same ex post
optimal rule—that is optimal for the speciﬁcs h oc k sin the particular order of the period
immediately before the vintage—performs very poorly for the same shocks on average.
The reasons are clear from our prior examinations. The period ending in mid-2003
contained a number of important, correlated shocks; namely, the productivity boom
and the stock market boom. The episodic nature of these disturbances makes them
special. With knowledge of these shocks including the order of their arrival, a policy—
even a policy constrained to respond to just two objects, inﬂation and the output gap—
can be devised to do a reasonable job. But with randomization over these shocks,
so that one knows their nature but not the speciﬁc order, the best policy is very
diﬀerent. This tells us is about the cost of hubris: a policy maker that thinks he
knows a lot about the economy and acts on that belief, may pay a substantial price if
the world turns out to be diﬀerent than he expected. This impression is ampliﬁed by
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rule—as they must be—are not too bad.
One might wonder why the November 2003 model is so much more sensitive to
policy settings than the February 1997 model. Earlier, we noted that performance in
general is jointly determined by initial conditions (that is, the baseline), the stochastic
shocks, the model and the policy rule. All of these factors are in play in these results.
However, as we indicated in the previous subsection, the nature of the shocks is an
important factor. The shocks for the February 1997 model come from the relatively
placid period of the late 1960s to the mid-1990s, whereas the shocks to the November
2003 model contain the disturbances from the mid-1990s. We tested the importance
of these shocks by repeating the experiment in this subsection using the November
2003 but restricting the shocks to the same range used for the February 1997 vintage.
Performance was markedly better regardless of the policy rule. Moreover, there was
less variation in performance across policy rule speciﬁcations. Since, however, the
stochastic shocks come from the same data that render the model respeciﬁcations,
this just emphasizes the importance of model uncertainty in general, and designing
monetary policy to respond to seemingly unusual events in particular.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper has examined real-time model uncertainty in the United States. To do
t h i s ,w eh a v ee x p l o i t e da na r c h i v eo fe v e r yv i n t a g eo ft h eF R B / U Sm o d e lo ft h em a c r o
economy since the model’s inception as the Board of Governor’s macroeconometric
model in 1996. We examined how the model properties have changed over time and
how the optimal policies for those vintages have changed alongside.
We found that the time variation in model properties is surprisingly substantial.
Surprising because the period under study, at eight years, is short; substantial because
the diﬀerences in model properties over time imply large diﬀerences in optimized
policy coeﬃcients.
We also compared diﬀerent policies by model vintage, doing so in two diﬀerent
ways. In one rendition, we compared policies conditional on bootstrapped model
residuals; in the other, we conducted counterfactual simulations examining perfor-
mance over approximately the same period where the model vintage was estimated.
Besides ﬁnding that our optimized rules diﬀer by vintage, we also found that plausi-
ble alternatives to the optimized policy result in signiﬁcant incremental losses. This
puts policy makers in the horns of a dilemma. On the one hand, time variation in
the FRB/US model suggests that model uncertainty is substantial and thus policies
should be designed with an eye toward minimizing the implications of misspeciﬁcation
of the model. On the other hand, the results also suggest that performance depends
in an important way on the particular characteristics of the rule.
Finally, we found conﬂicting evidence on the eﬃcacy of discretion in monetary
policy, deﬁned here as the FOMC picking the federal funds rate period by period,
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historical policy was better than even the best policy rule. In another case, however,
the best two-parameter rule performs better than the historical path in spite of the
fact that the historical policy can react to a much wider range of variables.
We have shown that model uncertainty matters for policy. But none of the policies
considered here explicitly considered model uncertainty in their design. A useful
extension would be to examine the extent to which common methods for dealing
with uncertainties would ameliorate the problems identiﬁed here. This subject is
t a k e nu pi nT e t l o w( 2 0 0 4 b ) .
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This appendix provides a summary of the evolution of the supply block of the
FRB/US model. In particular, we outline the changes in the deﬁnition and behavior
of potential output and its determinants over time.
The model’s supply side is fairly detailed. In order to keep the exposition as
short and transparent as possible, we simplify in describing certain aspects of the
determinants of some variables where the simpliﬁcation will not mislead the reader.35
Table A1 facilitates the exposition by explaining the mnemonics of the equations.
Table A1
Appendix equation mnemonics







ww average work week
nq labor quality
u civilian unemployment rate
z total factor productivity
k capital services or stock
e energy input
s wedge between payroll and establishment surveys
t{j} time trend, commencing at date j
d{k} shift dummy, equals zero before k and unity thereafter
mave moving average operator
A.1 Aggregate supply in the July 1996 vintage
In the model’s ﬁrst vintage, potential output in the (adjusted) non-farm business
sector, y∗,was the product of potential employment, n∗,trend labor productivity, q∗,
a n dt h et r e n da v e r a g ew o r kw e e k ,ww∗, as shown by equation (A1). Equation (A2)
shows that potential employment was given by the trend labor force, lf∗, adjusted
for the NAIRU, u∗, and the trend in the wedge between the household and payroll
35For example, below we describe the describe trend labor productivity as being a geometric
weighted sum of lagged capital-to-output and energy-to-output ratios. This is true, but these actual
ratios are then modeled as a function of desired ratios, which in turn are a function of the ratio of
output price to user cost.
42
ECB
Working Paper Series No 610
April 2006surveys of employment, s∗, less a moving average of government employment. The
trend labor force is just the civilian population over the age of 16 multiplied by some
time trends and shift dummies. Trend labor productivity, q∗, is given by total factor
productivity, z∗, and a long moving average of past capital-output and energy-output
ratios, multiplied by their factor shares (and divided by labor’s share). Target hours,
h∗, was also modeled as a split time trend, as was the trend component of the wedge.
The NAIRU, u∗, was set at 6 percent and trend total factor productivity, z∗,w a s
assumed to have grown exogenously at an annual rate of 2.3 percent until 1972, and




















∗ =1 /exp(a0 + a1t47 + a2t801) (A5)
The historical record aside, the point to take from the above is that potential out-
put was modeled as essentially deterministic. The primitives underlying the evolution
of y∗ over time were time trends, shift dummies and slow moving averages of variables
that do not ﬂuctuate a great deal with perturbations to the data. The underlying view
behind potential output at the outset of the model was a distinctly Keynesian one
wherein the vast majority of ﬂuctuations in output arose from demand-side factors.36
Two other aspects of the state of the modeling world in 1996 are worth noting.
First, in response to the introduction early in 1996 of chain-weighting of the National
Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) data, the model section considered adding
chain-weighted code to the model. However, the idea was rejected because of the
volume and complexity of the necessary additional code. Second, the economic im-
portance of computers (and associated equipment and software) were beginning to
attract the attention of some of the Board staﬀ. In particular, Oliner and Sichel
(1994) studied the implications of the penetration of computers in the workplace for
the measurement of capital stocks and labor productivity. At the time they regarded
t h es t o c ko fc o m p u t e r sa st o os m a l lt ob eo fq u a n t i t a t i v ei m p o r t a n c ef o rp r o d u c t i v i t y
measurement. For this reason, and because the relatively new and rapidly growing
high-tech sector deﬁed modeling, the model section declined to split out computers
36Perhaps more accurately it could be said that persistent supply shocks were infrequent enough
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would be revisited, and for related reasons, as we shall see.
A.2 The October 1997 vintage
As the ﬁrst row of Table 1 in the main text shows, by October 1997, it was apparent
that the staﬀ were about to record a large error in the forecast of GDP growth in the
four quarters ending 1997:Q3: The July 1996 forecast was for growth in real GDP
of 2.2 percent, while the data would eventually come in at 4.8 percent. And yet this
underestimate of output growth was arising without concomitant increases in inﬂation
as the demand-side view of the world would predict. The model builders responded
by revising the model’s NAIRU, raising it the 1980s to about 6.3 percent (measured
on a demographically adjusted basis), and then allowing a gradual reduction over the
ﬁve years from 1989 to 1993 to about 5.5 percent, or one-half percentage point below
t h ep r e v i o u se s t i m a t ef o rt h i sp e r i o d .A sb e f o r e ,h o w e v e r ,u∗, and other supply-side
variables were extrapolated into the forecast period as exogenous trends; that is, there
was no stochastic element to their revision and projection.
A.3 The April 1998 vintage
Instead of modeling trend labor productivity, q∗, as a combination of three slow-
moving pieces, and allowing a residual, the model section decided to enforce the
identity connecting q∗ and z∗, eliminating the residual in the equation. Equation
(A4) above still describes how trend labor productivity evolves in forecasting and
simulation; in the historical data, q∗ however, was constructed with a kinked time
trend with z∗backed out. As a consequence, looked at in isolation, trend total factor
productivity showed signiﬁcant time variation. Mathematically, the change was of
trivial importance; however, the measure of trend total factor productivity that was
implied by the choice of trend labor productivity was now a variable that could be
reviewed and checked for its plausibility.
A.4 The August 1998 vintage
The shift in the NAIRU in October 1997 aside, potential output determination re-
mained essentially the same until the August 1998 vintage, other than some tinkering
in the number and dates of breaks in trend in the h∗ equation. At that point, the
economy was booming and more workers were being elicited to oﬀer their employment
services than the staﬀ had previously anticipated. The model builders decided to re-
place the split time trend in the desired labor force, lf∗,w i t ha nH o d r i c k - P r e s c o t t
ﬁlter of the actual labor force in history and then extrapolate that trend exogenously
into the forecast period.
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∗ = lfpr
∗ · n16 (A6)
lfpr
∗ = hp(lfpr) (A7)
The H-P ﬁlter, even though it is a two-sided ﬁlter, responds to ﬂuctuations in the
data in a way that time trends (kinked or otherwise) do not. Thus, the idea that the
supply side of the economy had its (persistent) stochastic elements was creeping into
the model.
At about the same time, the incipient productivity boom was raising new ques-
tions of a lower frequency (or longer-run) nature than the sorts of questions the
model had originally been envisioned as answering. In particular, the model sec-
tion was asking (and being asked) about the implications of a sustained increase
in productivity capacity on wage determination, on stock market valuation, and on
the equilibrium real interest rate. In addition, with the ﬁscal position of the federal
government rapidly improving, questions regarding the determination of bond rates
and the current account were coming to the forefront of discussion. These questions
required longer-run simulations and more carefully modeled steady-state conditions
than before. Approximations that had been deemed acceptable in model code for
earlier vintages of the model were coming under strain of the new demands on the
model.
A.5 The August 1999 vintage
With the model section conducting more and more long-term simulations (simulations
of, say, more than 20 years in length) the limitations of some of the approximations
that had been used in place of chain-weighting in the model code were becoming
apparent. What was "close enough" over an 12-quarter horizon was not close enough
when approximation errors were allowed to essentially cumulate over an 80-quarter
horizon. Accordingly, the section adopted chain-aggregated equations for the ﬁrst
time.37 The pertinence of this for the present discussion of the supply side of the
model is that the long duration productivity shocks, and other supply shocks, that
are now routinely carried out with the model could not have been done properly
without chain-aggregation code.
A.6 The June 2000 vintage
The modeling of ww∗ with split time tends disappeared in favor of a Hodrick-Prescott
ﬁlter. Out of sample, the trend was projected exogenously. The model section’s use
of stochastic trends was expanding.
37More precisely it was Divisia aggregates, a close cousin of chain weighting, that was included
within the model code, but this is a distinction of no importance.
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∗ = hp(ww) (A9)
Also around this time, Steve Oliner and Dan Sichel, both of the Board’s staﬀ,
were completing their work, subsequently published in 2002, on the contribution of
computers and other high-tech investments to the capital stock and consequently
on measured productivity. Their work would eventually allow the model group to
accurately measure capital services for the ﬁrst time.
A.7 The May 2001 vintage
May 2001 featured large-scale changes to the model’s supply side. First, and most









∗/(1 − 0.0350) (A10)
Second, investment in equipment and software was broken into two categories,
high-tech and "other". And third, trend total factor productivity was modeled using
an H-P ﬁlter, z∗ = hp(z) with z deﬁned as the Solow residual of the equation im-
mediately above evaluated with y instead of y∗ on the left-hand side. At this point,
H-P ﬁlters were ﬁguring in the construction of potential output in three places: the
trend work week, the trend labor force participation rate, and trend total factor
productivity.
A number of events conspired to bring about these changes (or facilitated their
adoption) most of which have already been mentioned. These include the ongoing
productivity boom ; the adoption of chain-aggregation model code; an acceleration in
the decline in computer prices in 1999; the increase of computers and other high-tech
equipment as a share of expenditures on machinery and equipment; and the BEA’s
comprehensive revision in December 1999 and January 2000 which added software to
the deﬁnition of capital services.
The economic boom in the second half of the 1990s had made the kinked-time-
trend view of trend labor productivity untenable; in the March 2001 vintage, for
example, there were four breaks in trend for q∗, including two as recent and as close
together as 1995:Q3 and 1998:Q1. As noted above, it also changed the nature of
the questions that were asked of the model, turning them more toward longer-term
issues, which changed the demands on the model. Finally, the events in high-tech
production and investment made the avoidance of disaggregating expenditures on
machinery and equipment too costly to bear.
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Concern with the two-sided nature of the H-P ﬁlter had been building for some
time among some of the model section’s members. If one interpreted capital put in
place and labor supply as the outcome of rational, optimizing agents, then the stock
of capital and the level of potential output should reﬂect the beliefs of ﬁrms and
workers over time. It followed that "trend" variables should not use information that
was not available at the time decisions are made; that is, two-sided ﬁlters should be
avoided.
The ﬁrst step in the section’s reconsideration of this was to replace the H-P ﬁlter
of the trend labor force participation rate with a (one-sided) Kalman ﬁlter estimate.
The Kalman ﬁlter model allowed the change in the log of the growth rate of the labor
force participation rate to be a stochastic (drift) process. The model also allowed
for the inﬂuence of the unemployment rate and unidentiﬁed stationary shocks on
the participation rate. With this change, a distinction was introduced between the
actual growth rate of potential output, ∆y∗, and the trend growth rate, g∗,w i t h
the latter being interpreted as agents’ beliefs about potential growth going ahead.
T h em o d e lh a da l w a y sh a da ne x p e c t a t i o n sb l o c k ,b u tf o rt h em o s tp a r tt h em o d e l ’ s
expectations code was concerned with short-term expectations of stationary or "gap"
variables.38 The new view of trend labor force participation was the ﬁrst formal step
toward broadening the pre-existing modeling convention and reﬂected an increased
appreciation of expectations of trend levels and growth rates. This new view would
eventually have substantial eﬀects on measures of certain latent variables such as
potential output growth as a comparison of the data shown in Figure 2 of the main
text makes clear. 39
A.9 The March 2002 vintage
The H-P ﬁlter for the average work week is replaced by the drift component of a
Kalman ﬁlter model for that variable. For the expected trend growth rate of poten-
tial, g∗,a measure of the expected growth rate of trend total factor productivity is
introduced. Here too, a Kalman ﬁlter is used and an I(2) drift term is extracted.
38Exceptions to this included the expected long-run inﬂation rate and the expected real interest
rate in the long run, as well as certain levels or shares of personal income. The former two variables
were based on survey and ﬁnancial market data, respectively, and could reasonably be said to
represent private sector expectations. The expected income variables were ad hoc autoregressive
speciﬁcations.
39This distinction is the main reason why the growth rate of potential for the August 2002 vintage
shown in Figure 2 looks so much more volatile than its predecessors. The expected growth rate upon
which some of the model’s agents base their decisions at any given date in history was smoother.
At this stage, however, with just the labor force particpation rate modeled using the Kalman ﬁlter,
the distinction was not all that large.
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